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Abstract. The authors treat distinctly the concept of right and liberty, in the sense of behaviours, behaviours 
guaranteed to satisfy some needs by the coercive force of the state. Reveals and criticizes the inconsistencies in 
the semantics and the significance of the two terms in some normative acts, including their implications in theory 
and practice, also presenting some proposals of law ferenda related to art. 10 of the ECHR. The authors claim 
that even in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights we find phrases with different meanings for the words of 
justice and freedom. Different, inconsistent meanings of this kind also appear in art. 5, art.9, art.10, art.11, art. 17 
of the European Convention on Human Rights. Using the phrases: "proclaimed rights and freedoms” and "rights 
or freedoms" as within the Convention,  would seem as two different concepts. Instead, from the phrases "the 
right to freedom" and "this right includes freedom", occurs other meanings and semnifications  for the concepts 
of justice and liberty, that appears as inconsistency. “Summarising, the authors consider that both in theory, 
practice and especially in the law it is necessary to use distinctly the two terms of “right“ and “freedom”. 
Keywords: law, freedom, obligation, free choice, difference, behaviour, precision 
Streszczenie. Autorzy odrębnie traktują pojęcie prawa i wolności w rozumieniu zachowań, postępowań gwa-
rantujących zaspokojenie niektórych potrzeb przez siłę przymusu państwa. Uwidaczniają i krytykują niespójności 
w semantyce i znaczenie tych dwóch terminów w niektórych aktach normatywnych, w tym ich implikacje w teorii 
i praktyce, a także przedstawiają niektóre propozycje de lege ferenda dotyczące art. 10 EKPC. Autorzy twierdzą, 
że nawet w Powszechnej Deklaracji Praw Człowieka znajdujemy wyrażenia o różnym znaczeniu dla słów prawo 
i wolność. Różne, niespójne znaczenia tego rodzaju pojawiają się także w art. 5, art. 9, art. 10, art. 11, art. 17 
Europejskiej Konwencji Praw Człowieka. Z wyrażeń „głoszone prawa i wolności”, „prawa lub wolności” używa-
nych w Konwencji wynikałoby, że są one dwoma różnymi pojęciami. Jednakże, z wyrażeń „prawo do wolności” 
i „to prawo obejmuje wolność” wynikają inne sensy i znaczenia dla pojęć prawa i wolności, które wydają się być 
niekonsekwencjami. Podsumowując, autorzy uważają, że zarówno w teorii, praktyce, a zwłaszcza w prawie ko-
nieczne jest odrębne użycie tych dwóch pojęć: prawa i wolności.   
Słowa kluczowe: prawo, wolność, obowiązek, wolny wybór, różnica, zachowanie, precyzja 
Introduction 
The notion of law has more senses such as "all 
legal norms", "Science of legal norms" and that the 
State guaranteed the behaviours of teen-agers. In 
doctrine, in legal documents, and even in the basic 
acts we find the expressions "right to liberty", "right 
is a freedom" and "freedom is a right" or that "the 
right of freedom from" which creates problems of 
understanding and uniform implementation of the  
law, and sometimes confusion with great impli-
cations.  
For instance Jean Morange’s confusion of public 
liberties critique and rights. This author points out 
that: "public individual rights, represents" the possi-
bility recognized individuals to require the State to 
take concrete steps, assuming positive obligations, 
so that they can fully benefit from the exercise of 
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these rights. Thus defined, individual public rights 
are distinguished public freedoms, they shall only be 
recognized individuals opportunities to exercise, 
sheltered from any external pressure, a number of 
activities" (Morange , 2002). The doctrine and the ju-
risprudence, we find the phrase "the right to liberty 
and security" in a questionable background such as: 
"the right to liberty and security are intended to pro-
tect the person's physical freedom against any ar-
rests or detentions arbitrary or abusive” (Engel, 
1976). We have reservations concerning the expres-
sion "right to liberty" but also to the fact that physical 
freedom would only reduce the protection of free-
dom of the person against any arrests or detentions 
arbitrary or abusive because apart from freedom of 
physical state can be affected by any person or en-
tity other than daughter State. In other treaties, we 
find the expression "rights-freedoms" (Renucci, 
2007). 
In terms of confusion with special implications, 
we analyze, for example, the expression "the right to 
work is guaranteed" (art. 77 of the Romanian Con-
stitution of 1952, article 18 of the Constitution of the 
1965 Romanian) expression that requires in addition 
to protecting it and providing a job for the State. Or 
the phrase "freedom of work is guaranteed or de-
fended" differ from the first because it does not re-
quire the provision by the State of a job through dis-
tribution. Thus, art. 21 para. 3, of the Constitution of 
Romania in 1923 to provide "freedom will be de-
fended". 
Materials 
Having regard to the requirements of the 
principle of legality as regards the accuracy, clarity, 
accessibility1 and forecasting2 you need to specify 
the legal norms, we believe that there is a short utility 
approach to the concepts of law and liberty in the 
meaning of behaviours.  
Unfortunately even in the Universal Declaration 
of human rights we find expressions with different 
meanings for the words right and freedom, even in-
compatible, you might say. Thus in article 2 and ar-
ticle 3. 29 it follows that the rights are freedoms when 
it states: "everyone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration ...", or when 
using the expression "rights and freedoms". In article 
18, art. 19 and article 20 of this declaration uses the 
expression "right to liberty" which may be considered 
a tautology if these concepts would be the same if 
not identical, to opine that phrase, is contrary to the 
concepts used above. In  article 30 of the same act, 
the expression "rights or freedoms" induce the idea 
of differences between these two concepts, though 
in art. 18 and article 19 we find phrases like "this right 
includes freedom to" establishing a different relation-
ship between the two concepts.  
Different, inconsistent meanings of this kind ap-
pear in art. 5, article 9, article 10, article 11, article 
17 of the European Convention on human rights3. 
The expressions "rights and liberties proclaimed", 
"rights and freedoms" used in the Convention would 
result that these are two different concepts. Instead 
of the terms "right to liberty" and "this right includes 
freedom" it follows other uses and meanings for con-
cepts of law and of freedom which appears as incon-
sistency. In these conditions if we consider that both 
the right and the freedom are concepts that define 
the behaviours to satisfy needs we will find 
it difficult to accept that all the acts from the scope 
of the concept of freedom, which in our concept are 
endless as forms, contents and number, might 
be included between the acts falling within the notion 
of law. It is indisputable that these expressions 
involve discussions with respect to accuracy, com-
prehension, accessibility, and compliance with regu-
latory foresight, including their implications. 
In the Declaration of the rights of man and of the 
citizen we find phrases: "right to liberty", "this right 
shall include the freedom", instead we find: men are 
born and remain free and equal in their rights (art. 1). 
Freedom is to be able to do everything that does not 
harm each other (article 4) and the law is not entitled 
to prohibit only actions that are dangerous to society. 
Everything that is not prohibited by law may not be 
prevented, and no one can be constrained to do 
what the law does not require it (article 5). However 
in article 3. 11 of the Declaration of the rights of man 
and of the citizen, we find the following formulation: 
the free communication of thoughts and opinions is 
one of the most precious rights of man, which also 
forms include discussion because it could be inter-
preted that to induce the idea that freedom of com-
munication is a right. What's more in  article. 
2 of the Declaration of the rights of man and of the 
citizen, we find the expression: these rights are lib-
erty, property, security... which in our view the for-
mulation does not meet the requirements of accu-
racy, clarity, accessibility and forecasting because it 
asserts that freedom is a right. 
In the Romanian Constitution one does not find 
the expressions: right to liberty, this right shall 
include the freedom but on the contrary we notice a 
distinct usage of those two concepts to the terms re-
spectively as when enshrining the right to life (art. 
22), the right of defence (art. 24), the right to infor-
mation (article 32), the right to vote (art. 36), etc., and 
the term freedom when referring to freedom of con-
science, freedom of opinion, freedom of belief, free-
dom of thought, (art. 29), the freedom of expression 
(art. 19), freedom of Association (art. 39) etc. Unfor-
tunately, contrary to art. 31 of the Romanian Consti-
tution, in art.70 of law no 287/2009 amended by law 
No. 17/2011 on the new civil code it uses the words 
right to free speech, the exercise of this right and not 
free speech and the exercise of this freedom. Thus 
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the question arises whether between freedom and 
law there is a distinction? If there is a difference then 
it presents theoretical and practical interest? These 
questions are taking shape in two different opinions. 
In the first opinion it is claimed that between law and 
freedom there is no difference and in another review 
you can argue that the meaning of guaranteed to 
satisfy such needs through the force of compulsion 
of the law differs from the State freedom differentia-
tion of theoretical and practical interest. 
Discussion 
The question about the differences between right 
and freedom Frédéric Sudre says: Apart from the 
fact that the distinction between civil and political 
rights, on the one hand, and economic, social and 
cultural, on the other hand, between "rights of... ", 
which I assume an abstention on the part of the 
State, and "rights to...", which advertises its part, 
benefits from an extremely simplifying terminology 
(more individual liberties appear under the name of 
rights. In the relevant international conventions: the 
right to liberty and security, the right to a fair trial, the 
right to freedom of expression, etc.). It is necessary 
to notice that there is a categorical opposition be-
tween the two categories of rights (Sudre, 1989). 
The first review of Prof. I. Muraru shows that con-
stitutional terminology relating to these two con-
cepts, law and freedom, while nuanced, designate a 
single legal category, namely the fundamental right, 
claiming the right to liberty and freedom is a right. He 
argues that there is no legal distinction, being in fact 
a single legal notion. Refinement of terminology, 
shows he has at least two explanations. "An expla-
nation has an historical view”. The second explana-
tion relates to the legal language expressiveness 
and beauty, but that takes advantage of the initial 
meaning and tradition. Often, human rights are 
called the public liberties of citizens. Freedom of ex-
pression is a comprehensive expression, it evokes 
both freedoms and human rights (citizens), and the 
fact that they belong to public law and constitutional 
law, and are therefore subject to a special legal re-
gime". Referring to the historical explanation of the 
concepts of law and liberty, prof. Muraru shows: "At 
first, the catalogue of human rights arose as require-
ments of human freedoms in opposition to public au-
thorities, and these freedoms do not signify any from 
other than a general attitude of abstention. The evo-
lution of freedoms, in the wider context of political 
and social developments, resulted in the crystalliza-
tion of the concept of human rights, the concept and 
complex legal meanings. Especially in relation to 
State authorities, human rights (public liberties) got 
involved and correlative obligations of respect and 
defence. Over time, these freedoms had to be not 
only proclaimed but also promoted and, especially, 
protected, guaranteed. We can thus see that today, 
between law and freedom there is a synonymous of 
legally binding" (Muraru, et. Al.  2001).   
 In the second opinion, we consider that there are 
differences between the rights and freedoms, on the 
other hand, but to explain this opinion, first we con-
sider that it is necessary for a few words about free 
will, absolute freedom, freedom and necessity, right 
and obligation.  
The right to an instance of an individual right or 
as a collective are able, faculty recognized by soci-
ety, or behaviour imposed by it through the State to 
meet the needs of an active and passive subject, in 
the spirit of fairness, to do, to do, to give or not to 
give, or to claim or receive anything, provided that 
needed by the force of compulsion of the State. 
Right into the assumption above is always at least a 
correlative obligation it owed to a person, group, 
company, which may be in the form of positive obli-
gation4, negative or mixed requirement.  
We believe that the obligation is recognized or 
enforced by the company through the State, a topic 
to another topic, whereby the first is kept as in the 
spirit of good and of equity, to do, to do, to give or 
not to give something, according to the rights and 
freedoms of the second, under the sanction of state 
coercion. So the obligation is a legal person whose 
execution is guaranteed to need through the force of 
compulsion of the State5. In this instance the law so-
ciety recognizes, protects and guarantees the inter-
ests of legitimate goods, and other values of the in-
dividual, the community and society in order to meet 
needs, while ensuring the necessary force neces-
sary in bringing about compliance. So in this respect 
the right assumed behaviours6, of the subject and 
the subject right obligation law, correlative behav-
iours, guaranteed and protected by the State to de-
fend certain values. This instance has the right not 
to be confused with the acceptation of the law as a 
set of legal norms governing the rights, freedoms, 
obligations, duties.  
Through freedom, according to D.E.X. means 
able to act after its own will or desire; the possibility of 
conscious human action in terms of knowledge (and 
under) the laws of nature and society development 
(DEX, 1994). This definition is questionable because 
it relates only to a part of physical liberty7 and  action 
and no inaction as the part of other activities. Also, this 
definition does not include mental freedoms, intellec-
tual, faith, conscience etc. On the other hand we see 
that this definition is freedom shores of knowledge 
and ruling the laws of development of society and 
nature. Referring to the social laws which limit the 
freedom we appeal to John Stuart Mill who draws a 
clear distinction between the scope of the acts, 
conducts individual concern the sphere in which 
neither the state nor community have nothing to 
intervene, the individual is fully sovereign acts or 
conducts field concern (touch) and the other (the only 
sphere in which state and society would be entitled to 
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interfere, affecting the interests of others or certain 
general interests). 
The notion of "free will" requires absolute 
freedom of man, completely independent of the 
need8 and objective causality (Pavel Apostol..., 
1978) what behaving discussions. We reckon that a 
man can not have absolute freedom if we consider 
the possibility or impossibility of removing causal, 
and the need for natural laws. In a universe where 
there is no natural causal, necessity, links more or 
less stable, natural law, natural order would certainly 
not exist to enable the existence, construction, 
processing, mastering nature, systems, ecosystems, 
etc. In such a universe that only God can create, 
transform, destroys an object, act without regard to 
causality, necessity and any natural law. Without 
natural order, space, structure, system time, stabil-
ity, interaction, motion, etc., is amorphous, unde-
fined and only God could let them out of the spatial-
temporal dimensions, motion, energy, etc. Man can 
act taking into account the necessity of knowledge 
and foresight, avoiding the effect by removing the 
causes or prevention or delay of the causes, but can-
not destroy the necessary natural link cause and ef-
fect. For instance,  man does not destroy the causal 
link between the fire and the heat level but there is 
acting on the cause of the fire, extinguishing or con-
trolling can protect a loose but does not prevent heat 
dissipation of the heat. We consider that even free-
dom of conscience is not absolute and is limited to 
the individual's physical and mental capabilities of its 
preparation, experience, etc. Romans said sublata 
tollitur effectus, meaning, cause and effect fades 
away. Or, and this is a way to act on time effect but 
does not destroy the causal link required such as that 
of fire and heat. In the same vein, the indeterminism 
determinism denies claiming that the phenomena 
and processes in nature and society are not causally 
determined, not subject to the natural law of objec-
tive necessity and are determined by the hazard, 
free will manifesting itself as a chaos of chance. In 
our opinion that we do not discover, or we don't know 
the cause doesn't mean that it doesn't exist. 
Montesquieu defines freedom as the ability to do 
what the law allows, if a citizen could do what they 
forbid he would not have the freedom that others 
could do the same (Montesquieu, 1959); If we 
consider the natural laws then currently count this 
definition. But reporting to social laws can not agree 
with this definition because social laws can be unjust 
certain natural rights and freedoms against which 
would affect so-called freedom. Patrick Wachsmann 
defines such freedom: Freedom is the person who 
does what he wants and not what one wants to do; 
It assumes the absence of extraneous constraints 
(Wachsmann , 1996). We believe this definition is 
also questionable because it does not specify what 
"strange compulsion" shall mean respectively a nat-
ural compulsion, coercion or arbitrary constraint 
should be human. The concept of freedom means 
not only the greater than or less than independence 
which possess the individual versus society, but also 
the degree of independence which it considers as 
normal and happy both to society and nature. Thus 
one can speak of limited freedom or liberty. In the 
same context Immanuel Kant defined the idea right 
through the idea of freedom of the individual, but re-
spect freedom limited to others. 
Jean Rivero considers that ”freedom is the 
power to self-determination, by virtue of which man 
himself chooses his behaviour” (Rivero, 1991), so it 
is a power that exerts himself. Other authors believe 
that "freedom" and "power" are "two antithetical 
terms”. According to Rivero, ”freedom" and "power" 
are two contrasting realities and therefore 
incompatible at concerning the relationships 
between two people. One of them extending power, 
namely the power to command or prohibited reduces 
negative freedom of the other, and vice versa, as the 
two expanding its sphere of freedom, decreases the 
power of the former" (Bobbio, 2007). We note that 
this definition of freedom only reporting what another 
power does not include  nature. 
In an essay Humboldt State shows that the 
objective is only "safety", understood as "freedom’s 
certainty in the law (Humboldt , 1792). We consider 
that is a questionable phrase, "freedom within the 
law", because we believe that freedom is infinite and 
can not be defined and exhausted in law because 
the law defines what is forbidden showing freedom 
and not its contents or what is permissible.Thus, 
according to article 4 of the Declaration of the rights 
of man and of the citizen of 1789 as part of the Con-
stitution of France ordering: "freedom is to be able to 
do everything that does not harm another. Thus, the 
natural rights of each man knows no limits other than 
those required of other members of society to enjoy 
the same rights. These limits can be determined not 
only by the law". In our opinion, that definition of liberty 
is restricted and is only in relation to social constraints 
and omits reporting freedom from the necessity of the 
natural limits of the object oriented individual. And ar-
ticle 5 shall read: "the law is not entitled to prohibit only 
actions that are dangerous to society. Everything that 
is not prohibited by the law may not be prevented, 
and no one can be forced to do what the law does 
not require it". 
Article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights also defines freedom shores in only the rights 
and freedoms of others, man-made laws, just 
requirements of morality, public order and the general 
welfare in a democratic society omitting the limits set 
by necessity, by laws of nature, by cause and effect, 
by forces of nature, etc. De facto, considering that 
"Freedom consists precisely in understanding the ne-
cessity of objective laws, knowledge of reality and the 
forces of nature and social life, based on this 
knowledge". F. Engels, quoted by Pavel Apostol in 
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his paper, shows: "Freedom is not in your dreams, 
independence towards the laws of nature, but also in 
the knowledge of these laws and the possibility of put-
ting them consistently into action in order to achieve 
certain purposes." Therefore we believe that freedom 
is the class that defines the scope of the individual in 
relation to the need, the laws of nature and laws of 
social objectives, including legitimate rights and 
freedoms of others. For instance, we consider in this 
regard, that the property is the result of an agreement 
that restricts the freedom of others in space became 
private property. Understanding and fulfilling a "legiti-
mate property fair" does not mean the limitation of 
freedom since surrendering to the exercise of a discre-
tion does not mean limiting freedom. 
As a result, between law and liberty in the sense 
provided above, we believe that there are differ-
ences, as follows: 
a) the exercise of a person's freedom assumes
certain powers by it what it requires from other
subjects only a negative obligation, not to do
anything to prevent the exercise of that power
unhindered (freedom) by the holder thereof;
b) freedom does not require, as a rule, the positive
obligations on the part of other legal subjects
and individuals, concerned to do something its
correlative, as it implies a right. Thus, freedom
to work does not imply the obligation of the
State to provide employment, or another is the
situation when constituantul has the right to
work is guaranteed, provided that it would as-
sume and ensuring employment by the State.
For instance, the right to life "under whose
protection is established by article 2 of the
Convention, is of the essence, requirement of a
general nature to the Contracting States not to
prejudice, through its agents, this right, that is
not the cause of death of a person, except as
specified in the second paragraph of the text,
and interpreted narrowly. At the same time, the
text imposes a positive obligation on States to
take all appropriate measures for the effective
protection of the right to life" (Birsan, 2005). It
also assumes debt obligations of the borrower
to pay the creditor's claim; right to vote implies
the obligation of authorities to organize and
carry out the exercise of this right (to do),
including to comply with it;
c) freedom involves only the State an obligation to
defend and ensure the conditions for unhin-
dered exercise thereof;
d) as opposed to liberty, the right to assume obli-
gations, both positive and negative, that is to
do, Yes, required, not required, and does not
give. At the same time, it is true that freedom
means positive obligations, but only for the
State, in a limited way, where a guarantee is re-
quired to prevent the violation of them and de-
fend it when breached. Positive obligations as-
sumed are rights for others; 
e) contents of a right shall be governed by rule de-
fined by law, in order to establish credentials for
the right and obligations of the positives and
negatives of others, its correlative, including of
the State so those behaviours that are allowed
and those behaviours that are required and the
correlative warrant, such as in the case of the
right to compensation for expropriation, the
right to education, the right to pension, etc.;
f) subject to the right is specified, and it involves
delivering, marking, regulation by law, when the
subject is limitless and liberties but sometimes
exercise of freedom is limited by the legitimate
rights and freedoms of others, and other prohi-
bitions laid down by law. We consider in this
respect that, Freedom of expression as free-
dom of expression, so a private environment is
unlimited as long as it does not exceed the pri-
vate sector. Only when we speak of freedom of
expression as freedom publishes some limita-
tions, are involved specified in the Constitution,
in relation to the rights and freedoms of others.
For example: "freedom of expression may not
harm the honour, dignity, private life of the per-
son and the right to their own image," says art.
30 section 6 of the Romanian Constitution or
this provision implies certain limitations. Out-
side these limits the freedom of behavior with
the exception of prohibitions is infinite and can-
not be described in a law. Although in freedom,
behaviour can not be described fully by law, we
consider that it is wrong to argue that everything
that is not forbidden is permitted without ex-
pressly excluding from this assertion, con-
straints, limiting exercise, suppression, etc. im-
plying that there touches the right or freedom.
Or just the constraints, limiting exercise, sup-
pression, etc. implies that there touches the
right or freedom to be allowed should be pro-
vided for in the regulations, and subject to cer-
tain conditions provided by law otherwise
abuse appears in law or in fact. For example
the doctrine referring to the breach of the right
to privacy through audio and video records
without the consent of the person claiming that
the authorities may make such intrusive while
expressways are not prohibited. "whereas the
audio or video recordings may be authorized
when, and about the preparation of some seri-
ous crimes and for identifying and locating of-
fenders, what it involves and information work,
in the absence of a prohibitive, these records
text can be carried out and that, if precursory
acts are authorized according to the law" (Teo-
doru, 2008). Unfortunately we find such mis-
takes  in law. By way of example might invoke
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and art. 916.2-sentence in c. proc. pen. where 
the legislature provides: "Any other recordings 
may constitute evidence unless they are pro-
hibited by law." 
g) in terms of the behaviours included the right
number is located in a closed interval, when
freedom is an open interval;
h) it can be argued that the right to liberty, the right
of appearing as a limitation of  freedom. Thus,
freedom of thought, belief and opinion is unlim-
ited; that's why we believe that the talk of a right
of thought, belief, expression, incorrectly, as a
means to induce the idea of thinking, of faith, of
what they think or believe, which seems ab-
surd. We consider that it is inspired, and the
phrase "the right to freedom of thought, free-
dom preceding the right, and the right rule im-
plies some restriction of freedom. "Men are
born free and equal in rights".
i) in terms of limiting social freedoms are abso-
lute: freedom of thought, freedom of con-
science, freedom of opinion.
Conclusions 
Considering the above, given the importance of 
differentiating between right and freedom, we con-
sider that, in the right way, in the Constitution of Ro-
mania, how differently and in a number of 
international documents, is presented differently 
about the fundamental rights and fundamental 
freedoms. The fundamental freedoms are recognized 
and guaranteed: individual freedom, freedom of con-
science, freedom of expression, freedom of Assem-
bly, freedom of movement and that the fundamental 
rights: the right to life, the right to defense, the right 
to life or private family, the right to information, the 
right to education and others. In this context, we be-
lieve that the difference between law and liberty is 
useful in theory, in practice and in legal jurispru-
dence, with special effects: 
1) Is a difference between the terms: "the right to
work is guaranteed" and "freedom of work is
guaranteed; in the first case, the State is
obliged to provide jobs, while in the second
case is not;
2) Right to information covered by article 31 of the
Constitution of the Romanian and the obligation
to assume the information. Freedom to receive in-
formation without the express provision of the law,
do not assume the obligation to inform the one
who has the freedom to receive information.
3) Freedom of opinion, freedom of belief, freedom
of conscience cannot be limited by any law, as
opposed to rights that may also in certain cir-
cumstances be limited by law.
In our opinion, also very important are the provi-
sions of Article 2 of the Declaration of the rights of 
man and of the citizen provides: "Everyone is enti-
tled to all the rights and freedoms of all set forth in 
this Declaration, without distinction of race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political opinion, or other 
opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or any 
other situation resulting therefrom". 
Considering the aspects mentioned above, we 
consider that the provisions of article 4. 10 section 1 
of the European Convention on human rights 
(ECHR), are not sheltered from criticism when they 
provide: 
1) Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.
This right includes freedom of opinion and free-
dom to receive or impart information or ideas
without interference of public authorities and
without regard for borders. This article shall not
prevent States from subjecting undertakings
broadcasting, cinematography or television li-
censing arrangements.
2) The exercise of these freedoms involving the du-
ties and responsibilities, may be subject to cer-
tain formalities, conditions, restrictions or penal-
ties as are prescribed by law which are neces-
sary in a democratic society, for national secu-
rity, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
maintenance of order and preventing criminal of-
fences, the protection of health or morals, the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for
preventing disclosure of confidential information
or to ensure the authority and impartiality of the
judiciary.
Firstly, the use of the phrase "the right to free-
dom of expression", in the spirit of the above, we 
consider this inaccurate and ambiguous. That's why 
we believe that the wording "Any person has the 
right to freedom of expression", is outdated and that 
it could be replaced with: "Everyone has the freedom 
of speech" or "Freedom of expression is guaranteed 
under the law, to any person". 
Secondly, the phrase "This right shall include free-
dom of opinion…" we find questionable because:  
a) the possible behaviours, freedom cannot be
contained in a law, because the law subject, be-
haviours and secured permits, are laid down in
law, while in the case of the law only prohibited
behaviors and not allowed;
b) we deem wrongly included freedom of opinion
in the freedom of expression because only the
freedom of expression of opinion may be re-
stricted by law and freedom of opinion. On the
other hand, freedom of opinion is a fundamen-
tal freedom in its own right with a different legal
regime. The formation of opinions must be free,
on the basis of the necessary information, ac-
curate, complete and timely. No one may be co-
erced to adopt an opinion. But freedom of ex-
pression of opinion can be included in the free-
dom of expression but with some distinctions,
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as the expression of opinions is usually very 
limited. 
The third, article 10 section 2 of E.C.H.R. is 
worded as follows: "The exercise of these freedoms 
involving the duties and responsibilities, may be sub-
ject to certain formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
penalties as are prescribed by law..." may lead to 
confusion when referring to freedom of opinion and 
freedom of expression of opinion.  
We believe that the freedom of expression of 
opinion and behaving like the freedom of expression 
in general duties and responsibilities and may be 
subject to certain formalities, conditions, restrictions 
or penalties as are prescribed by law which are nec-
essary in a democratic society, for national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the mainte-
nance of order and preventing criminal offences, the 
protection of health or morals, the protection of the 
reputation or rights of others in order to prevent dis-
closure of confidential information or to ensure the 
authority and impartiality of the judiciary". 
In conclusion, we believe that in both theory and 
practice, particularly in the law, it is necessary to use 
two distinct terms of law and freedom. 
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1 In a ruling, the ECHR refers to conditions with which they must 
comply with a law that ". ..applicable law must be sufficiently acces-
sible to the citizen. Other condition: the law must be sufficiently pre-
cise to allow the citizen to provide, to a reasonable extent, the con-
sequences of its behaviour. (The case of Silver and others v. United 
Kingdom, Judgment of 25 March 1983 (room) (series A No. 61) Vin-
cent Berger, (2007) jurisprudence of the European Court of human 
rights, 6th Edition of IRDO, (translated by Ionel Oltean) Bucharest, 
2008 p. 507. 
2 The notion of predictability depends much on the content of the 
text in question, its scope, and even the number and quality of its 
recipients. See ECHR, 28 March 1990, Groppera Radio AG and 
others v. Switzerland, series A No. 175 paragraph 68. 
In another decision of the ECHR is spoken by the requirement 
that the law must be reasonably predictable.(Case C.R. v.  
the United Kingdom Judgment of 22 November 1995 (room) (se-
ries A No. 335-C) Vincent Berger, op. cit. p. 387. 
3 The same observation can be made if we are referring to some 
articles of the International Covenant on Civil and political rights 
ratified by Romania by Decree nr. 212/1974, and other founda-
tional documents. 
4 Positive obligations can be any natural person, legal person  
icluding the State. For the positive obligations of the State to see 
Frédéric Sudre, (1989), (translated by Raluca Bercea), European 
law and international human rights, Polirom, Iaşi, (2006), p. 187. 
Jean-Francois Renucci, (2007) Treaty of European human rights 
law, (translated by Cătălina Constantin), Hamangiu Publishing 
House, Bucharest, (2009), p. 90-91. 
5 In the article 1164 of the New Civil Code provides for that. "The 
obligation is a right by virtue of which the debtor is kept to provide a 
benefit to the creditor, and it is entitled to obtain the benefit due". 
Dabu V., Guşanu A.-M., LAW AND LIBERTY. LEGISLATIVE INCONSISTENCIES. THE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERENTIATING BETWEEN LAW AND  




6 Referring to this last thesis of law, Al. Otetelişanu show: ”The right 
includes rules of conduct that are born under the influence of social 
factors and individual factor, in order to achieve the happiness of 
individuals who cannot be provided with due regard for national in-
terests" See Al. Otetelişanu, Some basic principles of law science, 










7 We believe that it refers only to a part of physical freedom as:  Until 
the coming of the island Friday it is conceivable only  
a physical, mental, etc. of Robinson Crusoe obviously limited. At 
this stage we can't talk straight as a correlative obligation of an-
other person. After his appearance Friday on the island appears 
in competition and limitation of freedom to those two people but 
also any rights of everyone if they lay down certain rules, habits. 
8 "The need to designate properties and relations that have an 
internal theme, arising inevitably from the essence of things, 
their laws" 
 
 
 
 
 
 
